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Historical Context of Negotiating with Terrorists
• Non-negotiation Orthodoxy
• Negotiations reward violent behaviour, encourage further terrorism;
• Negotiations grant legitimacy; and
• Terrorist demands are unattainable
• Merits of Negotiating with Terrorists
• Cheaper – financially, politically, economically, temporally, psychologically
• Addresses root causes of terrorism
• Influence terrorists’ behaviour
Research Question & Key Argument
• Research Question
• Why is it so hard to negotiate with terrorists?
• Can the success rate of terrorism negotiations be improved?
• Key Argument
• Terrorism negotiations as a more dominant counter-terror strategy
• Dismissing negotiations is counterproductive
Defining Terrorism
• No universal definition of terrorism
• Terrorism is a label
• Results in subjective counter-terrorism measures
• Need to change understandings of terrorism
• Classify terrorists according to utility of violence
• Remove subjective language
Terrorism 
Negotiation 
Framework
Figure 1: Framework for 
Official Terrorism 
Negotiations
The closer negotiation 
variables are to the 
centre of the 
Framework, the greater 
the probability that it 
will contribute towards 
successful negotiations.
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Figure 2: Terrorism 
Negotiation Framework 
for the Irish Republican 
Army case study
Green = success 
variables
Red = impediment 
variables
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Figure 3: Terrorism 
Negotiation Framework 
for the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam case 
study
Green = success 
variables
Red = impediment 
variables
Islamic State 
(Iraq and Syria)
Figure 4: Terrorism 
Negotiation Framework 
for the Islamic State case 
study
Green = success 
variables
Blue = variables to be 
encouraged
Red = impediment 
variables
Findings & Recommendations
1. Certain negotiation variables are more or less likely to result in successful negotiated outcomes.2. The relevance and impact of these variables depends on the purpose of negotiations.3. The Terrorism Negotiation Framework facilitates identification, and succinct comparative analysis, of these variables. 4. The current understanding of terrorism limits negotiations’ effectiveness as a counter-terrorism instrument.5. Re-framing terrorism can increase negotiations’ applicability and success rate.6. Anti-terror legislation should be reformed to decriminalise behaviour that facilitates terrorism negotiations.7. Traditional approaches to negotiating are less likely to be effective in terrorism situations as they often manifest as zero-sum games.  8. The international community should transform its understanding of negotiations and embrace integrative negotiation practices that facilitate win-win outcomes.
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Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, then-President George W Bush proclaimed that ‘[e]very nation in 
every region now as a decision to make.  Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.’  This statement 
fuelled the still-prevailing orthodoxy that “we do not, and cannot, negotiate with terrorists”.  Despite the 
prominence of military counter-terrorism efforts, the international community has not only failed to end 
terrorism, but has further witnessed its increased rise and spread.
The primary justifications for not negotiating with terrorists allege that it grants legitimacy, rewards violent 
behaviour and encourages further terrorism, and that terrorist demands are unattainable.  However, the 
premise for non-negotiation discourse is flawed.  The rise in terrorism evidences that the use of force, negative 
sanctions, and coercion are not effective at deterring terrorism. Policy makers are employing a traditional, and 
out-dated, understanding of negotiations as the making of concessions.  Moreover, it is financially, politically, 
economically, temporally, and psychologically, more expensive to use force than to engage in negotiations.  
Further, the non-negotiation orthodoxy ignores negotiations’ unique benefits.  Negotiations address the root 
causes of terrorism through addressing underlying interests and grievances.  This reduces the need for 
pursuing further violence, and is more likely to produce lasting results.  Negotiations also enable States to 
influence terrorists’ behaviours.
As a result, States routinely engage in negotiations with terrorists, despite their official policies of non-
negotiation.  This led to the key argument that terrorism negotiations should be a more dominant counter-
terrorism strategy, and that dismissing negotiations as a diplomatic tool is counterproductive.  Terrorism 
negotiations can succeed under much wider circumstances than prevailing belief contends.
Despite its prominence, the international community still has not reached a universal definition of terrorism.  
As a result, “terrorism” is applied arbitrarily, labelling terrorists according to society’s political whims. This 
makes the distinction between terrorism, insurgencies, self-determination, guerrilla warfare, resistance 
movements, and criminal acts subjective.
Terrorism’s distinctive characteristic is the way violence is used, rather than the objectives it is used for. 
Consequently, re-framing terrorism according to terrorists’ utility of violence minimises subjective counter-
terrorism responses.
I created the Terrorism Negotiation Framework to identify and assess variables that are likely to beneficially, 
or detrimentally, affect terrorism negotiations.  The Terrorism Negotiation Framework maps negotiation 
variables across five sectors; who to negotiate with, what to negotiate about, when to engage in negotiations, 
where to perform negotiations, and how to conduct negotiations.  The closer each variable is to the centre of 
the Framework, the greater the probability that it will contribute towards successful negotiations.  As variables 
move outwards, the lower the likelihood of achieving a positive outcome becomes.  A bar represents variables 
that can have a range of influence; the longer the bar, the greater the potential variance.  Illustrating the 
potential range of influence empowers actors to apply the Terrorism Negotiation Framework to their specific 
context.  I anticipate the Terrorism Negotiation Framework being used by States and non-State actors alike as 
an instrument for guiding official terrorism negotiations
From this, this research suggests eight findings and recommendations, all of which support the central 
argument that dismissing terrorism negotiations is counterproductive.  The Terrorism Negotiation 
Framework, combined with re-framings of terrorism and negotiations, allow negotiations to be a much more 
effective counter-terrorism mechanism.  Through increasing the likelihood of a successful negotiated outcome, 
the pen can replace the sword as the dominant counter-terrorism instrument.
Transcript of President Bush’s address (21 September 2001) CNN 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>.
